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I.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding, and in the trial court, are:
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN

Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants and
Appellants

BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the State of Utah

Defendant, Counter-Claimant and
Appellee

CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah1

Defendant and Counter-Claimant
(not a party to the appeal)

1

Plaintiffs' separate actions against Box Elder and Cache Counties were
consolidated in the Box Elder action. Plaintiffs' prior application for permission to
appeal the trial court's decision as to Cache County was dismissed on procedural grounds.
See Appellate Case No. 20070682-CA. Therefore, this appeal is as to the trial court's
decision as to Box Elder County only.
i

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,

APPELLANTS'
OPENING BRIEF

Plaintiffs, CounterDefendants and Appellants,
vs.
Case No. 20090479-SC
BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant, CounterClaimant and Appellee.

Appeal from the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, 2009 UT App 99 which regarded
an appeal from an order entered by the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield, First Judicial
District Court for Box Elder County
Stephen R. Hadfield
Box ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
Attorney for Defendant, Counter-Claimant
and Appellee
9 West Forest Street, Ste. 310
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Counsel for Appellee

Shaun L. Peck
Brandon J. Baxter
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, CounterDefendants and Appellants
399 N. Main
Suite 300, Third Floor
P.O. Box 675
Logan, Utah 84321
speck @bplaw.biz
bbaxter @ bplaw .biz

Counsel for Appellant

I.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding, and in the trial court, are:
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN

Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants and
Appellants

BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic of the State of Utah

Defendant, Counter-Claimant and
Appellee

CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah1

Defendant and Counter-Claimant
(not a party to the appeal)

1

Plaintiffs' separate actions against Box Elder and Cache Counties were
consolidated in the Box Elder action. Plaintiffs' prior application for permission to
appeal the trial court's decision as to Cache County was dismissed on procedural grounds.
See Appellate Case No. 20070682-CA. Therefore, this appeal is as to the trial court's
decision as to Box Elder County only.
i

II.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Parties to the Proceeding

i

Table of Authorities

iv

Jurisdiction

1

Statement of Issues and Standard of Review

1

A.

Statement of Issues

1

B.

Standard of Review

2

C

Grounds for Seeking Review

2

Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules and Regulations

3

Statement of the Case

3

A.

Nature of the Case

3

B.

Course of the Proceedings

4

C.

Disposition of the Case at the Trial Court

6

D.

Proceedings before the Utah Court of Appeals

7

E.

Proceedings before the Utah Supreme Court

8

Statement of the Facts

8

Summary of the Argument

12

First Argument

12

ii

Second Argument

13

Third Argument

13

Argument

13

Introduction
A.

13
The Ombudsman's Act granted the Ombudsman's Office specific
authority to use ADR to resolve takings issues, including the
questions of ownership.

B.

14

An overly-narrow interpretation of the Ombudsman's Act unfairly
denies the Selmans their statutory right to arbitration. A more
reasonable application of the statute will not prejudice Box Elder
County.

C

18

Denying parties their right to arbitration with the Ombudsman's
Office violates strong public policy supporting ADR and effectively
strips the Ombudsman's Office of its statutory powers and duties.
23

Conclusion

26

Addendum

29

iii

III.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bagfordv. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095 (Utah 1995)

17

Baker v. Stevens, 114 P.3d 580 (Utah 2005)

24

Brooks v. Cigna Property and Casualty Companies, 700 N.E.2d 1052 (111. 1998)

24

Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 40 P.3d 599 (Utah 2002)

24

Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990)

17

Department of Natural Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 52 P.3d 1257 (Utah
2002)
2
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009)

12, 16

In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App. 2007)

21, 22

Kim v. City of New York, 659 N.Y.S.2d 145 (N.Y. 1997)

17

Matter of the Arbitration Between the State Insurance Fund and State of New York, 212
A.D.2d 98 (N.Y.A.D. 1995)
24
McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 980 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1999)

2

McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 980 P.2d 694, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 19
(Utah 1999)

2

Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992)

23

Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 173 P. 556 (Utah 1918)

25

Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc., 122 P.3d 654 (Utah App. 2005)
24

iv

Smith v. Price Development Co., 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005)

17

State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845 (WA 1981)

17

State v. Sopher, 71 P. 482 (Utah 1903)

25

Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 1996)

17

View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, LLC,

17

Wyndham v. Haines, 503 A.2d 719 (Md. 1986)

127 P.3d 697 (Utah 2005)

24

U.C.A. § 13-43-101

1, 3,13

U.C.A. § 13-43-102

16

U.C.A. § 13-43-201

10, 18

U.C.A. § 13-43-201(2)

15,18

U.C.A. § 13-43-201(3)(i)

18

U.C.A. § 13-43-203

15

U.C.A. § 13-43-204

6,10,11, 18

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1)

15, 19,20

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(2)

16

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)

19

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(a)(i)

2

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(c)

18

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(d)

18

U.C.A. § 17-41-101

4, 5, 8

v

U.C.A. § 17-26a-101

5

U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)

1

U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(4)

1

U.C.A. § 78B-11-101

23

U.C.A. § 78B-ll-129(l)(b)

3

U.C.A. § 13-43-101

1, 3, 13

U.C.A. § 13-43-102

16

U.C.A. § 13-43-201

10, 18

U.C.A. § 13-43-201(2)

15, 18

U.C.A. § 13-43-201(3)(i)

18

U.C.A. § 13-43-203

15

U.C.A. § 13-43-204

6, 10, 11, 18

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1)

15,19, 20

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(2)

16

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)

19

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(a)(i)

2

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(c)

18

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(d)

18

U.C.A. § 17-41-101

4, 5, 8

U.C.A. § 17-26a-101

5

vi

U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)

1

U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(4)

1

U.C.A. § 78B-11-101

23

U.C.A. § 78B-ll-129(l)(b)

3

Rules
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46(a)(4)
Cache County Code § 17.18.010

14
5

Merriam-Webster's Dictionary Online

20

vii

IV.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3102(3)(j) because it regards an order over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of this matter was transferred to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-3-102(4) which allows the Supreme Court to transfer
to the Court of Appeals certain matters over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction. This matter currently lies with the Supreme Court
pursuant to the Supreme Court's order dated October 1, 2009 which granted Appellants'
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Statement of Issues
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's

construction of the scope of the arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman
Act ("the Ombudsman's Act"), U.C.A. § 13-43-101 etseq.}

2

Unless indicated otherwise, all citations to the Ombudsman's Act are to U.C.A.
(2007) § 13-43-101 et seq. and do not incorporate changes made to the Ombudsman's Act
during later legislative sessions. The Ombudsman's Act in its entirety is included in this
brief as Addendum C.
1

A.

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that arbitrating questions of
ownership is beyond the scope of the Ombudsman's Act

B.

Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the question of
"ownership" is only peripheral to takings issues .

C.

Does arbitration of this dispute fairly fall within the purview of the
Ombudsman's Act.

B.

Standard of Review

Interpretation and application of a statute, such as the Ombudsman's Act, is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness.3 Furthermore, the issues of (1)
whether arbitration is mandatory; or (2) whether a trial court erred in staying arbitration
are reviewed "for correctness," according no particular deference to a prior court's
decision."4
C.

Grounds for Seeking Review

The Ombudsman's Act requires that arbitration under the Act follow the
procedures and requirements of Title 75B Chapter 11, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act5
The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act provides that an appeal may be taken from an order

3

Department of Natural Res. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 52 P.3d
1257, 453 Utah Adv.Rep.6 (Utah 2002).
4

McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 980 P.2d 694, 371 Utah Adv. Rep.
19 (Utah App. 1999).
5

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(a)(i); Addendum C.
2

granting a motion to stay arbitration.6 In this case, the trial court issued an order granting
a motion to stay arbitration, thus giving rise to the appeal.

VI.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS
Property Rights Ombudsman Act, U.C.A. § 13-43-101 et seq?

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case8

Plaintiffs/Appellants Fred, Laura and Bret Selman ("the Selmans") seek review of
the Court of Appeals decision dated April 16, 2009. The matter was submitted to the
Court of Appeals for review of the trial court's Memorandum Decision dated December
21, 2007 and Order dated January 15, 2008 holding that the underlying dispute should not
be submitted to arbitration under the Ombudsman's Act and ordering that arbitration
under the Act be stayed.9

6

U.C.A. §78B-ll-129(l)(b).

7

Addendum C.

8

Citations to the record on appeal will be designated by "RA" followed by the last
three digits of the trial case number, then followed by the page number(s) assigned by the
court clerk. For example, the citation "RA436:83" refers to the designated record on
appeal for case 070100436, page 83.
9

RA436:493-504; Addendum B-l and B-2.
3

B.

Course of the Proceedings

Plaintiffs/Appellants Fred, Laura and Bret Selman are principals of Harold
Selman, Inc. (collectively, the "Selmans"). Harold Selman, Inc. engages in a variety of
farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits. Harold Selman, Inc. owns certain real
property located in the mountain valleys east of the small town of Mantua, Utah (the
"Property"). The Property is bisected by the border between Box Elder and Cache
Counties.
This lawsuit formally began on April 30, 2007, when the Plaintiffs filed suit
against Box Elder County to stop Box Elder County's road construction activities on a
remote trail located on the Property. The Selmans' Complaint asserted several
independent claims, including:
•

Violation of the Agriculture Protection Area Act U.C.A. § 17-41-101
et seq.;

•

Violation of the National Environmental Protection Act; and

•

Violation of a Utah State Department of Agriculture and Food
conservation easement.

The Selmans further sought injunctive relief to stop Box Elder County's construction
activities.10
On May 11, 2007, the trial court entered a Temporary Restraining Order
("T.R.O.") halting road construction activities on the Property and ordering the

10

RA436:10-33.
4

reinstallation -.U a gale on the Pruprr* which Box Elder Counp h;uI 'HIM >\ ci

' i»'""'

T.R.O. remains in force today.11
'..,..-

' >i iinans filed a second suit against Box Elder County based on

the saint* fad pa'tcrn bml i i IIMK> additional i auses ol action, including:
•

Violation of the County / ana use
Act, U.L'.A. § 17-26a-101^j^.;

•

Trespass; and
uemnation,.12

•

The Selmans and Box Elder Coinih htt i iipulah d l< ilir ". oiisolidalion of these twn
actions against. Box Elder County.13
In order to stop Cache County from,,, unilaterally beginning road, construction
i

•-

* • i<

O-.;;.H,

;iiv ^clinaiis filed suit against

Cache County on June 2A, 2001 asserting ciai^ *
IL

Inverse condemnation;

III

Violation of the County Land Use, Development, and Management
Act, I J C.A. § 17-26a-10i • •
Violation of the Sensitive Areas Overlay /one Hi i^iacim n \ '.n he
County Code § HASMOetseq.;

IV
V.
n

Violation of the Agriculture Protection Area Act, U.C.A. §

RA436:82-85.

12

RA518:003-P1-

5

17-41-101 etseq.;
VI.

Violation of N.RPA;

VII.

Violation of the conservation easement.14

On June 7, 2007, prior to the Counties filing their answers, the Selmans filed a
request for arbitration of the dispute with the Property Rights Ombudsman's Office (the
"Ombudsman's Office") pursuant to U.C.A. § 13-43-204.15 On or about July 18, 2007,
the Ombudsman's Office formally accepted the Selmans' arbitration request and later
designated retired Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael Zimmerman as the arbitrator.16
C.

Disposition of the Case at the Trial Court

On July 25, 2007, Box Elder County answered the Selmans' complaint and
asserted a counterclaim to quiet title.17 On this same date, Box Elder County filed a
motion to bifurcate the Selmans' claims from the County's claim to quiet title. Box Elder
County also asked the Court to stay arbitration with the Ombudman's office.18 On July
25, 2007, Cache County filed a matching answer and motion in its case.19
Box Elder County's motion was briefed by the parties and proceeded to oral
14
I5

RA434:004-018.

AddendumD-l

16

Addendum D-2

17
,8

RA436:119-131.

RA436:135-141; 174-176.

19

RA434:022-043.
6

argument on December 13, 2007. 2 0 On I V a i n b n ,.N) "Of!? ihr tii.il ., uiui issued a
Memorandum

Decision bifurcating the case and granting Box Elder ( uiinh

i

nioin 11 ii •

stay arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office, 21 In deciding the issue, the trial court
icdsoning and the earlier memorandum decision granting Cache
County's moiiuu to .tnv ailuimiioii "
entered Tanu*^ •-\ 2008/
^

\ n o n l e i HMMII n» Mm N t l n I «>i 11 if \-" s motion was

;

Proceedings before the Utah Court of Appeals
.

lt<L

of Apptut

2008. 2 4 TheSclmaiisUmeU ' ^ ^

. • *

w ith the trial court on January 25,
..

same date, the Selmans timely submitted a Request for Transcript

this
to the First Di^f

*

Court Clerk for Box Elder County. 2 ''
As pari nil linn: appellate pm- ''<»iliinn. nn AiiiMisl l Y M i « , the Court of Appeals
issued an order granting leave to the O f i i t r of the Pro)M • ri y R i >; 11 f s O11 buds111,111 (m» 1111 11
amicus curiae brief in support of tlv \ : ^? position argued by the Selmans.
i •»i \c\\ i..

. nc })ai ties and the o i i KC of the Property Rights Ombudsman was

20

RA436:135-^

21

R A 4 ^ K^ i->

22

RA434: 5

2

!•* • • ! -

2

2

-»l 200; 204-215; 321-342; 343-359.
inJsii!! it ?

(v Addendum B-3.

-^

- J i i d u i i i I"! 1 .

' k,\436:502-504.
a \ 4 M - - .-

7

submitted to the Court of Appeals during the time period June 2008 through November
2008.
The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from the parties on March 26, 2009.
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on April 16, 2009. In its decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court.26
E.

Proceedings before the Utah Supreme Court

The Selmans filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari on June 15, 2009. Box
Elder County filed its opposition to the petition on August 12, 2009. This Court issued an
order granting the petition on October 1, 2009.27

VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS28
As mentioned above, the Selmans engage in a variety of farming, ranching, and
other agricultural pursuits in Box Elder County and Cache County. Harold Selman, Inc.
owns certain real property located in the mountain valleys east of Mantua, Utah (the
"Property"). The Property is bisected by the border between Box Elder County and
Cache County. The Property is designated by both Counties as an Agriculture Protection
Area under U.C.A. § 17-41-101 et seq. and is also subject to a conservation easement

26

Addendum A-l.

27

Addendum A-2.

28

See generally RA436:10-33; 37-38.
8

recorded by the Utah State Department of Agriculture and Food c: i i Ii u: le 30, 2006.
The portion of the Property at issue has historically been used as summer grazing
pasture f< •; \\w :^ miu^ \i\ L *»n >CK What is essentially a livestock trail traverses part of
llir |

:•» •"> li" iih'.l in U'lli I1" >• I'liln ,iii,l ( ji'ln ! 'nimhr,

I lie trail is known vari<»u>iv

as "Rocky Dugway Road," the "Three Mile Road ' m ihr \i {< IV^' *li^rrm.Wfci ihe
"Road"), in :* current condition, the Road is steep, rugged, and impassible by most
automobiles.
• -

•

•

..i . Me ^enaans

acquired die Tiopeii), ohovv uo public or private recorded easement

*

roadway, or any other reservation indicating a public interest m die Road. I rum the time
of tl le oi igii lal land grant of the Property in the late 1800fs to the present, there has been
no legal action adjudicating .in\ li.iil mi flu piopcih h In" \n\hh\

l"\l ilhu I "aifiet '*nml\

nor Box Elder County or any other governmental entity have ever taken action to
condemn the Road or otherwise acquire public access rights to the Property, The Selmans
1 lip - e alw a.)' s i i mil itaii led tl mt tl le Road, as it passes through the Property, as a private road
located on private ground. Accordingly the Road Lis I wn "iileil lot Led ,ind Mj-ncd .is
private.
Notwithstaiun.-iLL i.ie-Nc lads, in Spring 2007, both Box Elder County and Cache
Coi it it> passed i ssoh ltioi is claii r lii lg tl :ie R oad as a p I ibli : it oa :1 1 1 le Selmans opposed the
claims and plans outlined in the Counties' 2007 resolutions 1 in Ihemn »tc llir Si liiiu

9

were shocked when they discovered in April 2007 that Box Elder County had started road
construction activities on the Road, as it passed through the Property, without providing
them prior notice.29
As discussed previously, the Selman's filed suit against both Box Elder County
and Cache County to stop the construction activities on the Road where it passes through
the Selmans' Property. As a result of these actions, a Temporary Restraining Order was
entered in the Box Elder County case which stopped construction activities. That T.R.O.
is still in effect today.30
On June 7, 2007, the Selmans filed a request with the Ombudsman's Office,
pursuant to U.C.A. § 13-43-204, for arbitration of their dispute with the Counties. On or
about July 18, 2007, the Ombudsman's Office formally accepted the Selmans1 arbitration
request and later designated retired Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael Zimmerman as
the arbitrator.
The Ombudsman's Office was created to provide landowners and governmental
entities with a more expeditious and economical means of resolving takings disputes.
The Ombudsman's Act specifically directs the Ombudsman's Office to appoint attorneys
with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to positions

RA436:37-54.
RA436:82-85.
10

within the Ombudsman's Office. 31 "Takings and emui. *

;

!

'

Ombudsman*s Ao >>• me.in the provisions of the federal and state constitutions, the case
law interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provisions that <vaj m\ oi\ e
Loiisliiutinii.il issiii's ansiiiL" 11 MM lIn: use or ownership of real property; or, (b) require a
governmental unit to compensate a rr a 1 ftiopnl\ n\un i Im ,i Diisiiluiinn.il IJKIM;.' m it.)
provide for relocation assistance to those persons w h o are displaced by the use of eminent
domain. 3 2
Upoi 1 tl le i e q;t lest of a pit opei ty

-

misaiMiia,

mandate to arbitrate or mediate takings of emine . J*

»•

s

-;... has a statutory
* •-

property owners and governmental entities. 33 Under the O m b u d s m a n ' s Act, if arbitration
mediation is requested by a private party and arranged by the O m b u d s m a n ' s Office, the
i!<n ci'iiiiiii ill i iifih iiiuil'u ml iiiiisi paiiinp.iio "as il ihc IIMIUM W ere ordered to mediation
or arbitration by a court." 3 4
Despite the statutory mandate to arbitrate these disputes, the Counties moved the
ti ial cc i in: 1 1 :) stay th 5 a 1 t iti atioi 1 w itl 1 the Ombudsman's office. The trial court granted
BoxElder County's motion and hasmdnrd thai nmliaiioM n( M^* dispute , pur u HI" l" the

VC \

13-43-201(2); Addendu 1 C

L'
•"U.L.A

?} 13-43-204(1); Addendw.iC.
• .* •

udendum

Ombudsman's Act and through the Ombudsman's Office, be stayed until Box Elder
County's quiet title action is decided.35
The Selmans filed their Notice of Appeal in January 2008.36 Briefs were submitted
to the Court of Appeals during summer and fall of 2008.37 On August 15, 2008, the Court
of Appeals issued an order granting leave to the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the legal position argued by the
Selmans.
The Court of Appeals heard oral argument from the parties on March 26, 2009.
On April 16, 2009, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in which it affirmed the order
of the trial court. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals held that:
•

The ownership of the property at the center of the dispute is only
peripherally related to the takings claim;

•

That the question of ownership of the property does not fall under
the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman's Office; and

•

That the parties should fully litigate the ownership question before
arbitrating with the Ombudsman.38

IX.

35

RA436:493-501; Addendum B-l and B-2.

36

RA436:502-504.

37

RA436:505-519.

38

Harold Selrnan, Inc. v. Box Elder County, 208 P.3d 535 (Utah App. 2009) f l 11,
12 (Addendum A-1).
12

SuMM\ir (wnw \ K(;nMi'T ,ri
First Argument
The statutory scheme of the Ombudsman's Act grants the Ombudsman's Office
specific authority to use ADR tools, including arbitration, to resolve all issues related to
takii igs claii i is ii icl.ud.ii lg the tl 1.1 eshold elei 1 lei it of ownership. ' I he Ombudsman's office
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T1-. Act mandates that government entities shall participate 11. *\^&
proceedings with the Oi nbudsman's Office. Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice by
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Third Argument
A. restricted, interpretation of the Ombudsman's Act is contrary to public policies in
I, Itali and throughout the naliun which support arbitration as a time- and cost-effective
manner* of resol\ ii lg dispi ites In j: 1 ijj,ii:i|:;i, , ,,i\ ...ngs dispi ites a. 1 \ a> fi :»i 1 1 tl i.e Oi 1 lbi icisi 1 lai I'S
Office, courts fail to give effect to the legislative intent of the Ombudsman's Act and
unduly interfere with specific duties which the Legislature has assigned to the
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X.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The questions presented by this appeal are matters of first impression for this
Court. To date, this Court has never interpreted the Property Rights Ombudsman Act,
U.C.A. § 13-43-101 et seq. Furthermore, because the State of Utah pioneered the
concept of a property rights ombudsman, these questions are matters of first impression in
the nation. As such, the Supreme Court has an obligation to provide all interested parties
with guidance regarding the interpretation and application of the Act.39
Unfortunately, in this instance, the Courts below have interpreted the language of
the Act in a manner which is more narrow than the Act intended. The earlier decisions in
this matter restrict the Act in a manner which weakens the Act and renders it useless.
A.

The Ombudsman's Act granted the Ombudsman's Office specific

authority to use ADR to resolve takings issues, including the questions of ownership.
The Ombudsman's Act outlines general duties of the Ombudman's Office as
follows:
(1)

The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall
(a)

develop and maintain expertise in and
understanding of takings, eminent
domain, and land use law;

39

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 46(a)(4).
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* * *

(d)

advise real property owners who have a
legitimate potential or actual takings
claim against a state or local government
entity or have questions about takings,
eminent domain, and land use law;

(e)

identify state or local government actions
that have potential takings implications
and, if appropriate, advise those state or
local government entities aboi it those
implications; and

(f)

provide information to pn\ ate citizens, civic
groups, government entities, and other
interested parties about takings, eminent
domain, and land use tow and their rights and
responsibilities under the takings, eminent
domain, or land use law s through s em mars a 11J
publications, and by other appropriate means.41'
utory mandate, the Ombudsman's Office is directed to appoint

attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to
positions within the Ombudsman's Office.41
Ii i additioi 1 to it : or ei •< *i ' \i duties, tl le I -egislati ire ga\ e tl le Oi i: ibi idsi nai I'S Office a
specific mandate to use ADR to resolve disputes between private property owners and
government entities win. h !m olve takings or eminent domain issues when such
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U.C.A. § 13-43-203 (emphasis added); Addendum C.
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assistance is requested by the private property owner and is otherwise appropriate.42 If
the request falls within the statutory guidelines and is otherwise appropriate, the Act
grants the Ombudsman's Office no discretion. In these instances, the Ombudsman's
Office "shall" arrange for mediation or arbitration between the parties.43
Once a request for arbitration has been made to and accepted by the Ombudsman's
Office, the government entity is obligated by statute to participate in the arbitration or
mediation:
If arbitration or mediation is requested by a private property
owner under this section, Section 57-12-14 or 78-34-21, and
arranged by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman,
the government entity or condemning entity shall participate
in the mediation or arbitration as if the matter were ordered
to mediation or arbitration by a court44
Matters which are subject to ADR with the Ombudsman's Office include disputes
that:
(1) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real
property; or
(2) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner
for a constitutional taking.45
The directions and definitions of the Ombudsman's Act are phrased in broad, inclusive

42

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1); Addendum C.

43

Id.

44

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(2); Addendum C.

45

U.C.A. § 13-43-102(2); Addendum C.
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language, e.g. "that involve takings or eminent domain issues," "matters that involve
constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property."
Despite the broad reach of the language of the Act, the Court of Appeals has
concluded that the Ombudsman's Office is somehow unable to address the element of
"property ownership" in its ADR efforts.46 As a rationale for its opinion the Court of
Appeals reasoned that "ownership of property" is only "peripherally related to a takings
claim" and thus not appropriate for arbitration with Ombudsman's Office.47
This holding is problematic because the question of ownership is not "peripheral"
to takings litigation. Rather, ownership of property is at the heart of all takings disputes.
Ownership is the first of several mandatory elements in any takings claim.48 The
"ownership" element of a takings claim is never a foregone conclusion and is often at the
center of takings litigation in the State of Utah.49 Similarly, New York State appellate
courts hold that an inquiry into an owner's title is necessary in any analysis of a takings

46

Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County 208 P.3d 535, 538 (Utah App. 2009).
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Id.
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See e.g.View Condominium Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C., 111 P.3d 697, 704705 (Utah 2005); Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1996); Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097-1098 (Utah 1995); Colman
v. Utah State LandBd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990).
49

See e.g. Smith v. Price Development Co., 125 P.3d 945 (Utah 2005) regarding
whether a private party or the State have the ownership interest in a punitive damage
award.
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claim.

In Washington State, trial courts have an "obligation to try questions of title" in

takings actions.51 In holding that the question of ownership should not be part of
arbitration proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office, the Court of Appeals has ignored
the fact that "ownership" is an essential element of all takings issues which the Utah State
Legislature has assigned to the Ombudsman's Office for mediation and arbitration under
the Ombudsman's Act.
There is no reason that the Ombudsman's Office cannot arbitrate the ownership
element of a takings claim. The Ombudsman's Act does not prohibit such action. Rather,
to carry out its statutory mandate, the Ombudsman's Act directs the Ombudsman's Office
to appoint attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land
use law to positions within the Ombudsman's Office.52 Furthermore, the Ombudsman's
Act specifically allows the Ombudsman's Office to appoint qualified arbitrators from
outside the office to decide the dispute. Arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office is not a
lawless proceeding. Arbitrators are required to apply the relevant statutes, case law,
regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the arbitration and in
determining the award.53 In this case, Michael Zimmerman, a retired supreme court

]

Kim v. City of New York 659 N.Y.S.2d 145, 147 (N.Y. 1997).

State v. Evans, 634 P.2d 845, 849 (WA 1981).
- U.C.A. § 13-43-201(2); Addendum C.
;

U.C.A. § 13-43-204(3)(c) and (d); Addendum C.
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justice, was scheduled to arbitrate the parties' dispute. Certainly, such arbitrators are
qualified to consider the evidence and render an opinion on ownership, as well as the
other elements of a takings claim.
Finally, arbitration of ownership issues with the Ombudsman's Office is not the
end of the road. The Ombudsman's Act allows that any party may submit the arbitration
decision or any discrete issue from that decision to the district court for de novo review.54
Of course, such a review could include the question of ownership.
B.
An overly-narrow interpretation of the Ombudsman's Act unfairly
denies the Selmans their statutory right to arbitration, A more reasonable
application of the statute will not prejudice Box Elder County.
The Ombudsman's Act is easily applicable in the instant case. As evidenced by
the pleadings filed at the trial court, the dispute between the Selmans and Box Elder
County raises questions of takings and eminent domain law because the matter involves
constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of the Selmans' Property. Further,
the causes of action may require Box Elder County to compensate the Selmans for a
constitutional taking of the Property.55
On June 7, 2007, the Selmans filed a request with the Ombudsman's Office for
arbitration of their dispute with Box Elder County. After finding the Selmans' request for
arbitration was appropriate, on or about July 18, 2007, the Ombudsman's Office formally

54

U.C.A. § 13-43-201(3)(i); Addendum C.
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RA436:010-033; RA518:003-017.
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accepted the Selmans' request and later designated an arbitrator for the case as required by
statute.56 The actions of the Ombudsman's Office in accepting the request and arranging
for arbitration, simply tracked the procedure outlined in the Ombudsman's Act.57
There is no doubt that the Selmans' case fits the statutory requirements of the Act.
Furthermore, the Ombudsman's Office properly accepted the Selmans' request and made
arrangements for arbitration. Where these elements have been met, the
Ombudsman's Act is clear that Box Elder County "shalYm participate in arbitration as if
the matter were ordered to mediation or arbitration by a court.59
In restricting ADR proceedings with Ombudsman's Office, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have effectively deprived the Selmans of their statutory right to arbitrate
this dispute.
The Legislature's intent in establishing arbitration and mediation procedures under
the Ombudsman's Act was to grant private land owners a right to attempt to resolve
constitutional takings disputes through ADR, thus avoiding the undue expenditure of time
and money associated with civil litigation. Private property owners can be severely
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Addendum D-l; Addendum D-2.
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U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1); (3); Addendum C.
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Where a statute employs the word "shall," there is no discretion: "shall" . . . (b)
[is] used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory <it shall be
unlawful to carry firearmsx Merriam-Webster's Dictionary Online (Nov. 16,
2009)(available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall).
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U.C.A. § 13-43-204(1); (3); Addendum C.
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prejudiced when forced into litigation with government entities which have much greater
litigation resources at their disposal. By making participation in ADR through the
Ombudsman's Office mandatory for all governmental entities involved in takings
disputes, the Act attempts to level that playing field.
The Selmans have a statutory right to submit this controversy to arbitration with
the Ombudsman's Office. The Selmans have a right to expect that Box Elder County will
participate in the arbitration of issues accepted by the Ombudsman's office. By
participating in arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office, the Selmans could resolve this
dispute without expending the time or money which will be required by protracted
litigation. If Box Elder County is able to deny the Selmans their statutory right to resolve
this matter in a less expensive and more expeditious manner, the Selmans will have been
unfairly prejudiced. Unfortunately, in this instance, the County has circumvented the
purpose of the Ombudsman Act. With arbitration stayed, the Selmans have no choice but
to engage in expensive and time-consuming litigation at the trial court to resolve the
matter.
While Utah appellate courts have not addressed this specific issue, the Texas Court
of Appeals has enforced a statutory right to arbitrate constitutional takings claims. The
case of In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App. 2007)
involved an annexation dispute between the appellant, Spiritas, and the town of Little
Elm. In such disputes, the Texas Local Government Code provided, a private landowner
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the right to request that the municipality arbitrate the dispute. Accordingly, Spiritas
requested that Little Elm arbitrate the annexation dispute. Little Elm, however, attempted
to dodge the statute by ruling on the annexation issue before participating in the
mandatory arbitration.
Spiritas eventually sought relief with the Texas Court of Appeals, which held:
Section 43.052(1), which the legislature enacted
in 1999, states that a landowner may elect
arbitration after it has met with no success on its
petition that a municipality include an area
proposed to be annexed within the three-year
annexation plan. [Citations omitted.] Once that
occurs, the landowner and the municipality shall
proceed with arbitration as specified by section
43.052(1)
Accordingly, a private
landowner has a statutorily-created right to
arbitrate a dispute under section 43.052(1)
regarding whether its land should be included
in a municipality's three-year annexation
plan, and, in accordance with that right may
maintain an action to compel arbitration
under section 43.052(1) without the necessity of
a quo warranto proceeding.
(Emphasis added).60
Similarly, in this case, the Utah State Legislature has created a statutory right in
landowners to arbitrate takings disputes with government entities. If the civil action at
the district court proceeds prior to arbitration, the Selmans will be deprived of their
statutory right to arbitrate this dispute. As with the Spiritas case, arbitration after the

In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex.App. 2007).
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matter is resolved by the trial court would be meaningless. The issues will be moot, and
the expenses of time and money will have already been incurred. This Court should
follow the holding in Spiritas and not allow Box Elder County to deprive the Selmans of
their statutory arbitration rights.
In contrast to the prejudice the Selmans will incur if forced to litigate this matter
prior to arbitration, Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice if it is required to proceed
with mandatory arbitration. Arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office is not binding. If
either party is unhappy with the results of the arbitration, that party may proceed to
litigate the matter, denovo.
In sum, staying arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office deprives the Selmans of
their statutory right to mandatory arbitration with Box Elder County and causes the
Selmans to suffer unfair prejudice. Box Elder County will suffer no prejudice by
participating in the statutory mediation. For these reasons, the decision and order of the
trial court should be reversed.
C.
Denying parties their right to arbitration with the Ombudsman's
Office violates strong public policy supporting ADR and effectively strips the
Ombudsman's Office of its statutory powers and duties.
The Utah State Legislature has expressed its support for arbitration by adopting a
detailed statutory scheme to govern arbitration in the state.61 Indeed the Legislature's
enactment of the Ombudsman's Act, with its detailed and mandatory ADR provisions,

61

U.C.A. §78B-11-101 etseq.
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reflects the Legislature's recognition of and support for arbitration as an effective dispute
resolution mechanism.
Such endorsement of arbitration is relatively universal throughout all states. This
support is expressed in statutory arbitration provisions as well as case law. As one
example, the California Supreme Court expressed its support of arbitration as follows:
Title 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as enacted and
periodically amended by the Legislature, represents a
comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration
in this state... .Through this detailed statutory scheme, the
Legislature has expressed a 'strong public policy in favor of
arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of
dispute resolution.' . . . Consequently, courts will "'indulge
every intendment to give effect to such proceedings.'" . . . 6 2
This strong support for arbitration is prevalent in the case law of many other states, as
well.63
The language of the Ombudsman's Act reflects Utah's public policy in embracing
arbitration as a time- and cost-effective manner of resolving disputes. Unfortunately, the
opinion of the Court of Appeals conflicts with that public policy and Utah case law, as
well. Utah appellate courts have voiced strong support for arbitration as a dispute
resolution mechanism, explaining:
62

Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase 832 P.2d 899, 902 3 CAL.4th 1 (Cal. 1992)
(numerous internal citations omitted for readability).
63

See e.g. Brooks v. Cigna Property and Casualty Companies, 700 N.E.2d 1052,
299 IU.App.3d 68 (111. 1998); Wyndham v. Haines, 503 A.2d 719, 305 Md. 269 (Md.
1986); Matter of the Arbitration Between the State Insurance Fund and State of New
York, 212 A.D.2d 98 628 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y.A.D. 1995).
24

In Utah, the law favors arbitration, and as such, there is a strong
presumption against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration. See
Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, \ 12, 114 P.3d 580; Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v.
ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3, f 24, 40 P.3d 599. 'Consequently, a "waiver
of the right to arbitrate must be intentional," and may be inferred "only if
the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended
to disregard its right to arbitrate."' Baker, 2005 UT 32 at f 12, 114 P.3d 580
(quoting Central Fla Invs., 2002 UT 3 at f 24, 40 P.3d 599).64
In light of the strong public support for arbitration, the holding of the Court of
Appeals which dictates that the parties must "litigate first—arbitrate later" is seriously outof-step with Utah case law, Utah statutes, and the prevailing sentiments in courts and
legislatures nationwide.
The decision of the Court of Appeals also runs contrary to Utah case law which
has long recognized that courts may not "reach out and usurp powers which belong to
another independent and co-ordinate branch of the state government."65
In this instance, the Selmans properly referred the dispute to the Ombudsman's
Office. After submission, the Ombudsman's Office reviewed the matter and determined it
fell within the duties and authority granted to its office by the Ombudsman's Act. Then,
pursuant to statute, the Ombudsman's Office proceeded to arrange for arbitration of the
dispute under the statute. As the Ombudsman's Office was in the midst of carrying out
these statutory duties, the trial court reached out and pulled the dispute away from the

Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Management, Inc., 122 P.3d 654, 534 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18 (Utah App. 2005).
65

Salt Lake City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 173 P. 556, 52 Utah 210 (Utah

1918).
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Ombudsman's Office. Such action ignores the longstanding legal principal that Utah
courts have authority to interpret, construe, declare, and apply the provisions of a statute,
but may not interfere with action within the authority of an administrative office.66 In
essence, the decision of the Court of Appeals allows Utah trial courts to circumvent the
powers and activities of the Ombudsman's Office. This holding allows trial courts to
wrongfully usurp powers belonging to another independent and coordinate branch of
government. Such a decision is in error.
Should the opinion of the Court of Appeals be allowed to stand, it will open a path
by which all parties previously subject to proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office can
avoid their statutory obligation to participate in those proceedings. Should the analysis of
the Court of Appeals go uncorrected, any party that so wishes will be able to escape
proceedings with the Ombudsman's Office by simply raising the ownership element
inherent in all takings issues, and cite to the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this
matter. That argument will become an effective bar to proceedings with the
Ombudsman's Office for anyone who wishes to invoke that authority. This narrow
interpretation of the statute would eviscerate the legislative intent of the Ombudsman's
Act and strip the Ombudsman's Office of its authority to bring disputing parties to the
mediation table or to engage the parties in arbitration proceedings.
In light of the strong public support for arbitration, the County's position of

66

State v. Sopher, 71 P. 482 25 Utah 318 (Utah 1903).
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'litigate first-arbitrate later" is seriously out-of-step with prevailing sentiments in courts
and legislatures nationwide. Likewise, the Court's order, which allows Box Elder County
to sidestep the statutory arbitration requirements, is in direct opposition to strong public
policy nationwide favoring arbitration. For these reasons, the decision and order of the
trial court should be reversed.

XL
CONCLUSION
In an era of diminishing judicial resources, courts should interpret ADR statutes in
a reasonable manner which allows them to fulfill the mission envisioned by the
Legislature. To do otherwise, runs contrary to Utah public policy to promote and support
arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution procedures. The Court should not
improperly limit authority which belongs to another independent and co-ordinate branch
of the state government. The Court should interpret the Act in a manner which does not
cripple Ombudsman's Office in its attempts to resolve takings disputes between private
citizens and the public entities. The Court should interepret the Act in a manner which
protects the Selmans' statutory right to arbitration with the Ombudsman's Office. For
these reasons, the Selmans request that this Court reverse the order of the trial court in
this case.
/
/
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Harold Selman, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Fred Selman;
Laura Selman; and Bret Selman,

OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20080229-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

F I L E D
( A p r i l 1 6 , 2009)

Box Elder County, a body
corporate and politic of the
State of Utah,

2 0 0 9 UT App 99

Defendant and Appellee.

First District, Brigham City Department, 07010043 6
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield
Attorneys:

Brandon J. Baxter and Shaun L. Peck, Logan, for
Appellants
Barton H. Kunz II, Salt Lake City; and Stephen R.
Hadfield, Brigham City, for Appellee
Mark L. Shurtleff and Brent N. Bateman, Salt Lake
City, for Amicus Curiae Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman

Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and McHugh.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
^1
Plaintiffs Fred, Laura, and Bret Selman are principals of
Harold Selman, Inc. (collectively the Selmans), which engages in
a variety of farming, ranching, and other agricultural pursuits
on property the Selmans own, situated on the border between Box
Elder and Cache Counties (the Property). Box Elder County
attempted to build a road on a livestock trail that crossed the
property. The Selmans sued and subsequently filed a request for
arbitration of their dispute with the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman (the Ombudsman). Box Elder County filed a
counterclaim in district court to quiet title in the property,
The district court bifurcated the claims and stayed the
arbitration pending resolution of the quiet title action. The
question before us is whether the stay of arbitration is
permissible under the Ombudsman's enabling statutes (the
Ombudsman Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-43-101 to -206 (Supp.
2008). We affirm.

discovery and deadlines on the Selmans' claims until the quiet
title claim is decided. The district court granted Box Elder
County's motion, bifurcating the case and staying arbitration.
The Selmans appeal that decision pursuant to the Utah Uniform
Arbitration Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (2008)
(allowing parties to appeal "an order granting a motion to stay
arbitration").
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
%5
We are asked to consider whether the district court erred in
bifurcating the claims and staying arbitration of the dispute.
This is an issue of first impression. Because we conclude that
the outcome of this case depends on statutory interpretation, we
review the district court's decision for correctness. See
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic
Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, ^ 13, 200 P.3d 643.

ANALYSIS
%S
"In interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain the
Legislature's intent. We do so by first evaluating the best
evidence of legislative intent, namely, the plain language of the
statute itself. We give the words of a statute their plain,
natural, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning." Wasatch
County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, f 13, 179 P.3d 768 (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). We thus carefully
consider the statutory language at issue.
f7
The Ombudsman Act establishes and defines the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman, see Utah Code Ann. § 13-43-101 to -206
(Supp. 2008). Among other things, the Ombudsman is authorized to
mediate or arbitrate disputes between property owners and
gove rnment ent i t i e s:
If requested by the private property owner
and otherwise appropriate, the , . .
Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or
arrange arbitration for, disputes between
private property owners and government
entities that involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title
7 8B, Chapter 6, Part 5, Eminent Domain; or
(c) disputes about relocation assistance
under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation
Assistance Act.
Id. § 13-43-204(1).

20080229-CA

3

Selmans and the action is one for inverse condemnation, trespass,
or both, or it does not and the entire dispute most likely
evaporates.2
Ull Accordingly, we conclude that some issues peripherally
related to a takings claim are not appropriate for arbitration by
the Ombudsman; the ownership of the property in dispute is one
such issue. Further, the district court clearly retains
jurisdiction over any matters not before the Ombudsman. Indeed,
11
[t]he trial court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil
and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not
prohibited by law." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(l) (2008).
CONCLUSION
Kl2 The quiet title action in this case does not fall under the
statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman; that is, it is not a
takings or eminent domain issue. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court's ruling bifurcating the claims and staying
arbitration pending the outcome of the quiet title claim.

£%L*& / .

^AJ^UAJ^

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

Hi3

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

CarolynvB. McHugh, JudgeCv

2. We note that if the action is for trespass, it does not fall
within the scope of the Ombudsman Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 1343-201 (1) (Supp. 2008) .
20080229-CA
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Harold Selman, Inc.;
Fred Selman; Laura
Selman; and Bret Selman,
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants,
and Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 20090479-SC

Box Elder County,
Defendant, Counter-Claimant,
and Respondent.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, filed on June 15, 2009.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue.
"Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the
district court's construction of the scope of the
arbitration provision of the Property Rights Ombudsman Act."
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter. Pursuant
to rule 2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that
permits the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to
submit their briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be
permitted to stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent
extraordinary circumstances, no extensions will be granted by
motion. The parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon
its issuance.
For The Court:

Matthew B. Durrant
Associate Chief Justice

ADDENDUM B-1

Prepared an<l submitted by:
Barton H. Kunz II, Utah Bar No. 8827
CHR1STENSEN A JENSEN, PC.
15 West Sooth Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 323-5000
Facsimile: (801) 355-3472
Stephen R. Hadfield, Utah Bar No. 5707
BOX OLDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
01 South Main Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (435) 734-3329
Facsimile: (435)734-3374
N. George Daines, Utah Bar No. 0803
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
199 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (435) 755-1S60
Facsimile: (435)753-4002
Attorneys for Defendanis/Counterclainumis

fN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD SELMAN, INC. a Utah
Corporation; FRED SBLMAN. LAURA
SELMAN. and BRET SELMAN.
Plaintiffs .inJ Counterclaim
Defendants.
vs.
_BOX_ ELDERLCOUNTY .ijiod\^ornoriiie^

Case No.: 070100436 (consolidated)
Judge Ben H. Had field

ORDER GRANTING BOX ELDER
COUNTY'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE

AND STAY

and politic ot the State of Utah.
Defendant and Counlerdaimanl.

HAROLD SELMAN, INC. a Utah
Corporation: FKfc'D SJbLMAN. LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants.

i

vs.
CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant and Counterclaimant.

fhe Court considered defendant and counterclaimant BON Thler Count) \

Motion to

Bifuicate and Stay, the supporting and opposing memoranda submitted thereon (including «i
round of supplemental memoranda), and the arguments oJ counsel at a hearing held on the
motion, and issued a detailed Memorandum Decision on December 21. 2007

Based upon that

decision, the Court hereby O R D E R S that Box Elder County's Motion to Bifiucnte and Stay is
G R A N T E D i\i\d plaintiffs' and counterclaim defendants' Motion lo Rccon^idci August 7. 2U07
Order lo Bifurcate and Stay is D E N I E D

I

Accordingly

Box Elder County's counterclaim to quiet title is hereby bifurcated Irom the

plaintifls and counterclaim defendants* claims pursuant to Ut,jh Rule of Civil Pre;* eilure 4?(b).
1

Box Eldei ( otinl) s countcicldim to i|inei title shall be tried (o^ethn with Cat ho

County's counterclaim to quiet title before the plaintiffs' and counterclaims defendants claims
arc litigated;
3.

Any discovery or deadlines associated with the plaintiffs' and counterclaim

defendants' claims are stayed until Box Elder County's and Cache County's quiet title
counterclaims are decided, and
4.

Any mediation or arbitration mandated by the Office of the Property Rights

Ombudsman is hereby stayed until after the counties* quiet* title counierclajnis have been
determined, at which tune the issue may be raised with this Court

DATED this _/V_ day of January, 2008.

BY THE COURT

~r3-k M

Judge Ben H. J-luclficl4
Utah First District

APPROVED AS TO FORM this _^L day ol January. 200S
BEARNSON & PECK. L C.

Shci
Brandon J Baxter
Attorneys Jen Plawti/Js and
Counte'rclaim Dejenclcmts

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify lhal on ihis 4th day ofJanuary, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER GRANTING BOX ELDER COUNTY'S MOTION TO BIFURCATE
AND STAY to be served viafirstclass, postage prepaid U.S. mail upon the following:

Shaun L. Peck
Brandon J. Baxter

BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.
74 West 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321
Attorney.') for Petitioners, Plaintiffs,

and

Counterclaim Defendants

*«- [Utur^TU
Barton H. K u n z IJ

^
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER, STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.

Case No. 070100436

BOX ELDER COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

Judge: Ben H. Hadfield

Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants,
vs.

1

CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah,

1

Defendant and
Counterclaimant.

1
1

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Defendant and counterclaimant
Box Elder County's (hereinafter the "County") Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. In preparation of its
decision, the Court has reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum in Support, Plaintiffs'
Response in Opposition, Defendant's Reply in Further Support, Plaintiffs' Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support, each
1

document submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. Also,
a hearing was held in this matter on December 13, 2007. Furthermore, on August 7, 2007, Judge
Gordon J. Low rendered a Memorandum Decision in a substantially similar proceeding in Cache
County (Case No. 070101434) granting Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay. The
Cache County and Box Elder County matters have now been consolidated into the present case.
Under Rule 42(b), a court may "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice^]...
order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or third party claim, or any separate
issue or of any number of claims,... counterclaims ... or issues." The Utah Supreme Court has
held that "trial courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding bifurcation and consolidation
requests under rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," See, e.g., Coleman v. Dillman, 624
P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1981) (bifurcation under rule 42 may be accomplished for the convenience
and at the discretion of the trial court); Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 325 P.2d 258, 259 (Utah 1958)
(absent prejudice to a litigant, the trial court has discretion to consolidate matters for trial).
In seeking bifurcation and a stay, the County argues that their counterclaim to quiet title
should be tried prior to litigation and/or arbitration on Plaintiffs' claims. The County argues that
there is a threshold question as to ownership of the disputed road which should be resolved first
in order to further convenience, avoid prejudice and the expense of litigating unnecessary claims,
and efficiently resolve the instant matter. Plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants (hereinafter the
"Selmans") challenge the County's road resolution on various grounds and contend it constitutes
a taking, thus (arguably) requiring the County's participation in arbitration arranged by the Office
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(2).
However, the County argues that bifurcation should nonetheless be granted because if the road
belongs to the County, then the Selmans' claims fail; conversely, the County concedes that if the
Selmans' are determined to be the rightful owners, then a taking cannot occur without payment
of just compensation. Finally, the County argues that the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman's requirement that the County submit to arbitration should be stayed by this Court
until a determination has been made on the threshold issue of ownership. Accordingly, the
County seeks the Court to find that the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low is the "law
of the case" and that it should control the Court's decision as to Box Elder County.
2

In response, Plaintiffs argue that bifurcation and staying the arbitration is contrary to
statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43, and fails to make the matter more convenient or efficient.
Plaintiffs argue that given the statutory mandate, regarding arbitration, in UTAH CODE ANN. § 1343-204(2), the court should deny the requested stay. Plaintiffs claim that the Court should give
deference to the Legislature and the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in allowing the
matter to be first heard in arbitration. In response, the County argues that the statute does not
prohibit judicial authority to stay such proceedings, noting that the arbitration provided for under
the Act is subject to de novo review, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-43-204(3)(I). See also UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-3-4 ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all maters civil and criminal, and
not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law."). Accordingly, the County
seeks a stay of arbitration until after determination of ownership.
Plaintiffs also assert that bifurcation would be unfair and prejudicial to the Selmans and
that the issues are not clearly separable, as argued by Defendant. Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue
that arbitration, not bifurcation of complicated matters, is the most cost-efficient manner by
which the parties could resolve the matter. Plaintiffs also cite to the holding of Walker Drug Co.,
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1998) and assert, similarly, that bifurcation in the
instant matter would be unfair. However, the County properly distinguishes Walker Drug
wherein the issue of damages was tried prior to a determination of liability (known as "reverse
bifurcation"). In the instant matter, the Court finds that an action to quiet title would be an
appropriate issue for bifurcation (clearly not "reverse bifurcation") and within the Court's
discretion to so order.
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
"any order or other form of decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties ... is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties [emphasis added]." Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that the Memorandum Decision
rendered by Judge Low, as it adjudicates fewer than all the claims of the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties, can be revised by the Court under Rule 54(b) and notwithstanding the
"law of the case" doctrine cited by Defendant.
3

After reviewing the pleadings and the parties' arguments presented at the December 13,
2007 hearing, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs' analysis that pursuant to Rule 54(b), the Court has
the authority to revise the Memorandum Decision rendered by Judge Low on August 7,2007;
however, the Court finds no reason to revise the Decision. The rationale set forth in Judge Low's
August 7,2007 Decision corresponds with this Court's view of the bifurcation issue. Accordingly,
the Court finds that the Memorandum Decision entered by Judge Low on August 7, 2007, will not
be revised and will govern this consolidated matter, Case No. 070100436, and apply to Box Elder
County.
The Court also finds that the threshold issue as to ownership of the disputed road should
be resolved first, as bifurcation is likely to further convenience and an efficient resolution to this
matter. Furthermore, the Court finds that bifurcation should be granted because regardless of who
actually owns the property, an initial determination of ownership would likely lead the parties to
negotiate a settlement of remaining claims. Finally, with respect to the Property Rights •
Ombudsman Act, it appears that the Court has the authority to issue a stay. Therefore, the Court
will order a stay, but reserves for future adjudication the question of whether the Property Rights
Ombudsman Act applies to the instant matter. This issue may be raised after the threshold issue of
ownership is determined.
In accordance with the Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Low on August 7,2007,
and as supported by the facts and governing law, Defendant and counterclaimant Box Elder
County's Motion to Bifurcate and Stay is granted. Also, implicit in this Memorandum Decision,
the Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider August 7, 2007 Order to Bifurcate and Stay.
Counsel for Defendant is directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
Dated this QO day of December, 2007.
BY THE COURT:

:>>

Ben H. Hadfield
\P?:.>
- • ,"'' fi
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE- • ^ J?

4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

'7 \s^~

I hereby certify that on the ^ '

day of December, 2007, I mailed a true

and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision in the case of Selman
vs. B.E. County and Cache County, case number 070100436, as follows:

Barton H. Kunz II
Attorney At Law
15 West South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

N. George Daines
Cache County Attorney
199 North Main Street
Logan, Utah 84321

Stephen R. Hadfield
Box Elder County Attorney
09 West Forest Street, Suite 310
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Shaun L. Peck
Brandon J. Baxter
Attorneys At Law
74 West 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321

ADDENDUM B-3

In the First Judicial District Court
In and for Cache County, State of U
HAROLD SELMAN, INC., a Utah
Corporation; FRED SELMAN, LAURA
SELMAN, and BRET SELMAN,
PIaintiff(s),

MEMORANDUM
Case Number: 070101434^1
JUDGE: GORDON J. LOW

vs.

CACHE COUNTY, a body corporate and
politic of the State of Utah,
Defendant(s).

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Cache County's Motion to Bifurcate
and Stay filed on July 17,2007. The County requests to bifurcate the proceedings, litigate the issue with
respect to the County's claim to quiet title, and stay any further proceedings relative to further claims made
by the Plaintiffs. After review of the memoranda and affidavits filed in this case, the Court is satisfied that
judicial economy would be achieved should a bifurcation occur, and that the County's counterclaim should
be first litigated as it may be dispositive of a number of other claims made by the Plaintiffs which would
be better addressed separately. Additionally, it does not appear to be the kind of claim which the State
Office of Property Rights Ombudsmen was created to address in the first place. The Court does have
jurisdiction to control this litigation despite the reference to the State Office of Property Rights and
therefore, this Memorandum Decision will serve as notice that the proposed Order Bifurcating and Staying
Claims filed with the motion has been adopted by this Court and signed and entered this 7th day of August,
2007.
Dated this 7th day of August, 2007

Gordon JCLow, District Court Judge
First District Court

O P AUG 07 2007
•1-

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 070101434 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

IS

NAME
BRANDON J BAXTER
Attorney PLA
74 W 100 N
POB 675
LOGAN, UT 84321
N GEORGE DAINES
Attorney DEF
199 N MAIN
LOGAN UT 84321
BARTON H KUNZ II
Attorney DEF
15 WEST SOUTH TEMPLE STE 800
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
SHAUN L PECK
Attorney PLA
74 W 100 N
LOGAN UT 84321

•oC2r

day of

ourt Clerk
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ADDENDUM C

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
TJTXE 13. COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 43. PROPERTY RIGHTS OMBUDSMAN ACT

§ 13-43-101. Title
This chapter is known as the "Property Rights Ombudsman Act/

§ 13-43-102. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Constitutional taking" or "taking" means a governmental action resulting in a taking of real property that requires compensation to the owner of the property under:
(a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; or
(b) Utah Constitution Article I, Section 22.
(2) 'Takings and eminent domain law" means the provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, the case law interpreting those provisions, and any relevant statutory provisions that:
(a) involve constitutional issues arising from the use or ownership of real property;
(b) require a governmental unit to compensate a real property owner for a constitutional taking; or
(c) provide for relocation assistance to those persons who are displaced by the use of
eminent domain.

§ 13-43-201. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
(1) There is created an Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman in the Department of
Commerce.
(2) The executive director of the Department of Commerce, with the concurrence of the
Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board created in Section 13-43-202, shall appoint
attorneys with background or expertise in takings, eminent domain, and land use law to fill
legal positions within the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.
(3) A person appointed under this section is an exempt employee.
(4) An attorney appointed under this section is an at-will employee who may be terminated without cause by:
(a) the executive director of the Department of Commerce; or
(b) an action of the land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board.

§ 13-43-202, Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board — Appointment — Compensation - Duties
(1) There is created the Land Use and Eminent Domain Advisory Board, within the Office
of the Property Rights Ombudsman, consisting of the following seven members:
(a) one individual representing special service districts, nominated by the Utah Association of Special Districts;
(b) one individual representing municipal government, nominated by the Utah League
of Cities and Towns;
(c) one individual representing county government, nominated by the Utah Association
of Counties;
(d) one individual representing the residential construction industry, nominated by the
Utah Home Builders Association;
(e) one individual representing the real estate industry, nominated by the Utah Association of Realtors;
(f) one individual representing the land development community, jointly nominated by
the Utah Association of Realtors and the Home Builders Association of Utah; and
(g) one individual who:
(i) is a citizen with experience in land use issues;
(ii) does not hold public office; and
(iii) is not currently employed, nor has been employed in the previous twelve
months, by any of the entities or industries listed in Subsections (l)(a) through (f).
(2) After receiving nominations, the governor shall appoint members to the board.
(3) The term of office of each member is four years, except that the governor shall appoint three of the members of the board to an initial two-year term.
(4) Each mid-term vacancy shall be filled for the unexpired term in the same manner as
an appointment under Subsections (1) and (2).
(5) (a) Board members shall elect a chairfromtheir number and establish rules for the
organization and operation of the board.
(b) Five members of the board constitute a quorum for the conduct of the board's business.
(c) The affirmative vote of five members is required to constitute the decision of the
board on any matter.
(6) (a) No member may receive compensation or benefits for the member's service on the
board.

(b) (i) A member who is not a government officer or employee may be reimbursed for
reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of the member's official duties at the rates
established by the Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-J07.
(ii) A member who is a government officer or employee and who does not receive
expenses from the member's agency may be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in
the performance of the member's official duties at the rates established by the Division of
Finance under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(c) A member may decline to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in the
performance of the member's official duties.
(d) A member need not give a bond for the performance of official duties.
(7) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall provide staff to the board.
(8) The board shall:
(a) receive reports from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman that are requested by the board;
(b) establish rules of conduct and performance for the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman;
(c) receive donations or contributions from any source for the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman's benefit;
(d) subject to any restriction placed on a donation or contribution received under Subsection (8)(c), authorize the expenditure of donations or contributions for the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman's benefit;
(e) receive budget recommendations from the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman; and
(f) revise budget recommendations received under Subsection (8)(e).
(9) The board shall maintain a resource list of qualified arbitrators and mediators who
may be appointed under Section 13-43-204 and qualified persons who may be appointed to
render advisory opinions under Section 13-43-205.
§ 13-43-203. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman - Duties
(1) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall:
(a) develop and maintain expertise in and understanding of takings, eminent domain,
and land use law;
(b) assist state agencies and local governments in developing the guidelines required
by Title 63L, Chapter 4, Constitutional Taking Issues;

(c) at the request of a state agency or local government, assist the state agency or local
government, in analyzing actions with potential takings imphcations or other land use issues;
(d) advise real property owners who:
(i) have a legitimate potential or actual takings claim against a state or local govern
ment entity or have questions about takings, eminent domain, and land use law; or
(ii) own a parcel of property that is landlocked, as to the owner's rights and options
with respect to obtaining access to a public street;
( e ) identify state or local government actions that have potential takings implications
and, jf appropriate, advise those state or local government entities about those implicationsand
* r
*
(i) provide information to private citizens, civic groups, government entities and other
interested parries about takings, eminent domain, and land use law and their rights and re
sponsibilities under the takings, eminent domain, or land use laws through seminars and
publications, and by other appropriate means.
(2) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not represent private property
owners, state agencies, or local governments in court or in adjudicative proceedings under
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Adininistrative Procedures Act
(3) No member of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman nor a neutral third
party rendering an advisory opinion under Section 13-43-205 or 13-43-206, may be compelled to testify in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any review mediation, or arbitration by, or arranged through, the office.
'
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), evidence of a review by the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman and the opinions, writings,findings,and determinations of the
Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman are not admissible as evidence in a judicial action,
(b) Subsection (4)(a) does not apply to:
(i) actions brought under authority of Title 78A, Chapter 8, Small Claims Courts;
(ii) a judicial confirmation or review of the arbitration itself as authorized in Title
78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act;
(iii) actions for de novo review of an arbitration award or issue brought under the an
thority of Subsection 13-43-204(3)(a)(i); or
(iv) advisory opinions provided for in Sections 13-43-205 and 13-43-206.

§ 13-43-204. Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman -Arbitration or mediation of
takings or eminent domain disputes

(1) If requested by the private property owner and otherwise appropriate, the Office of the
Property Rights Ombudsman shall mediate, or conduct or arrange arbitration for, disputes
between private property owners and government entities that involve:
(a) takings or eminent domain issues;
(b) actions for eminent domain under Title 78B, Chapter 6. Part 5, Eminent Domain; or
(c) disputes about relocation assistance under Title 57, Chapter 12, Utah Relocation
Assistance Act.
(2) If arbitration or mediation is requested by a private property owner under this section, Section 57-12-14 or 78B-6-522, and arranged by the OfiBce of the Property Rights
Ombudsman, the government entity or condemning entity shall participate in the mediation
or arbitration as if the matter were ordered to mediation or arbitration by a court
(3) ( a ) ® 1° conducting or arranging for arbitration under Subsection (1), the Office of
the Property Rights Ombudsman shall follow the procedures and requirements of Title 78B,
Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
(ii) In applying Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, the arbitrator
and parties shall treat the matter as if:
(A) it were ordered to arbitration by a court; and
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman or other arbitrator chosen as
provided for in this section was appointed as arbitrator by the court
(iii) For the purpose of an arbitration conducted under this section, if the dispute to
be arbitrated is not already the subject of legal action, the district court having jurisdiction
over the county where the private property involved in the dispute is located is the court referred to in Title 78B, Chapter 11, Utah Uniform Arbitration Act
(iv) An arbitration award under this chapter may not be vacated under the provisions
of Subsection 78B-11-124(1 )(e) because of the lack of an arbitration agreement between the
parties.
(b) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall issue a written statement declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator when, in the opinion of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman:
(i) the issues are not ripe for review;
(ii) assuming the alleged facts are true, no cause of action exists under United States
or Utah law;
(iii) all issues raised are beyond the scope of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman's statutory duty to review; or
(iv) the arbitration is otherwise not appropriate.

(c) (i) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall appoint another person to
arbitrate a dispute when:
(A) either party objects to the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman serving as
the arbitrator and agrees to pay for the services of another arbitrator;
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman declines to arbitrate the dispute
for a reason other than those stated in Subsection (3)(b) and one or both parties are willing
to pay for the services of another arbitrator; or
^ (C) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman determines that it is appropriate
to appoint another person to arbitrate the dispute with no charge to the parties for the services of the appointed arbitrator.
(ii) In appointing another person to arbitrate a dispute, the Office of the Property
Rights Ombudsman shall appoint an arbitrator who is agreeable to:
(A) both parties; or
(B) the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman and the party paying for the arbitrator.
(iii) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may, on its own initiative or
upon agreement of both parties, appoint a panel of arbitrators to conduct the arbitration.
(iv) The Department of Commerce may pay an arbitrator per diem and reimburse expenses incurred in the performance of the arbitrator's duties at the rates established by the
Division of Finance under Sections 63A-3-J06and 63A-3-J07.
(d) In arbitrating a dispute, the arbitrator shall apply the relevant statutes, case law,
regulations, and rules of Utah and the United States in conducting the arbitration and in determining the award.
(e) The property owner and government entity may agree in advance of arbitration that
the arbitration is binding and that no de novo review may occur.
^

(f) Arbitration by or through the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not necessary before bringing legal action to adjudicate any claim.

J<

(g) The lack of arbitration by or through the OfGce of the Property Rights Ombudsman
does not constitute, and may not be interpreted as constituting, a failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies or as a bar to bringing legal action.

(h) Arbitration under this section is not subject to Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative
Procedures Act, or Title 78B, Chapter 6, Part 2, Alternative Dispute Resolution Act.
(i) Within 30 days after an arbitrator issues a final award, and except as provided in
Subsection (3)(e), any party may submit the award, or any issue upon which the award is
based, to the district court for de novo review.

(4) The filing with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman of a request for mediation or arbitration of a constitutional taking issue does not stay any county or municipal land
use decision, including the decision of a board of adjustment
(5) Members of the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may not be compelled to
testiiy in a civil action filed concerning the subject matter of any review, mediation, or arbitration by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman.

§ 13-43-205- Advisory opinion
At any time before a final decision on a land use application by a local appeal authority
under Section l0-9a-708 or ]7-27a-708, a local government or a potentially aggrieved person may, in accordance with Section 13-43-206, request a written advisory opinion from a
neutral third party to determine compliance with:
(1) Sections 10-9a-507 through 10-9a-511;
(2) Sections 17-27a-506lhrougi 17-27a-510\ and
(3) Title 11, Chapter 36, Impact Fees Act

§ 13-43-206. Advisory opinion — Process
(1) A request for an advisory opinion under Section 13-43-205 shall be:
(a) filed with the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman; and
(b) accompanied by a filing fee of $ 150.
(2) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman may establish policies providing for
partial fee waivers for a person who is financially unable to pay the entire fee.
(3) A person requesting an advisory opinion need not exhaust administrative remedies,
including remedies described under Section 10-9a-801 or 17-27a-801, before requesting an
advisory opinion.
(4) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall:
(a) deliver notice of the request to opposing parties indicated in the request;
(b) inquire of all parties if there are other necessary parties to the dispute; and
(c) deliver notice to all necessary parties.
(5) If a governmental entity is an opposing party, the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall deliver the request in the manner provided for in Section 63G-7-401.
(6) (a) The Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall promptly determine if the
parties can agree to a neutral third party to issue an advisory opinion.

(b) If no agreement can be reached within four business days after notice is delivered
pursuant to Subsections (4) and (5), the OfQce of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall appoint a neutral third party to issue an advisory opinion.
(7) All parties that are the subject of the request for advisory opinion shall:
(a) share equally in the cost of the advisory opinion; and
(b) provide financial assurance for payment that the neutral third parry requires.
(8) The neutral third party shall comply with the provisions of Section 78B-11 -109 and
shall promptly:
'
(a) seek a responsefromall necessary parries to the issues raised in the request for advisory opinion;
(b) investigate and consider all responses; and
(c) issue a written advisory opinion within 15 business days after the appointment of
the neutral third party under Subsection (6)(b), unless:
(i) the parries agree to extend the deadline; or
(ii) the neutral third party determines that the matter is complex and requires additional time to render an opinion, which may not exceed 30 calendar days.
(9) An advisory opinion shall include a statement of the facts and law supporting the
opinion's conclusions.
(10) (a) Copies of any advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman shall be delivered as soon as practicable to all necessary parties.
(b) A copy of the advisory opinion shall be delivered to the government entity in the
manner provided for in Section 63G-7-401.
(11) An advisory opinion issued by the Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman is not
binding on any party to, nor admissible as evidence in, a dispute involving land use law except as provided in Subsection (12).
(12) (a) If the same issue that is the subject of an advisory opinion is listed as a cause of
action in litigation, and that cause of action is litigated on the same facts and circumstances
and is resolved consistent with the advisory opinion, the substantially prevailing party on
that cause of action may collect reasonable attorney fees and court costs pertaining to the
development of that cause of action from the date of the delivery of the advisory opinion to
the date of the court's resolution.
(b) Nothing in this Subsection (12) is intended to create any new cause of action under
land use law.
(13) Unless filed by the local government, a request for an advisory opinion under Section 13-45-205 does not stay ihe progress of a land use application, or the effect of a land
use decision.
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June 7, 2007
Brent Bateman, Private Property Ombudsman
Elliot Lawrence, Private Property Ombudsman
Utah Department of Commerce
P.O. Box 145610
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-5610
Re:

Selmans, Box Elder County, Cache County Private Property Takings Matter

Dear Brent and Elliot:
This letter constitutes our clients' request that the Office of the Property Rights
Ombudsman conduct a mediation regarding certain private property takings issues.
As you are aware, our office represents Fred and Laura Selman, Bret and Michelle
Selman, and Harold Selman, Inc. ("the Selmans") regarding several private real property takings
issues involving Box Elder County and Cache County. As we have discussed, the particular
takings issue involves resolutions passed by the Counties in April and May which make claim on
private roads that pass through the Selmans' real property in the mountains on the Box Elder
County-Cache County border.
I appreciate the time that you have taken to speak to us and the various county officials
regarding this issue over the past few weeks. At this time the Selmans formally request that your
office conduct a mediation regarding the takings issues pursuant UCA § 13-42-204. The parties
to the mediation should include the Selmans, Box Elder County, and Cache County.
It is my understanding that upon a request by a private property owner it is mandatory for
your office conduct such a mediation. UCA § 13-42-204(1). It is my further understanding that
it is mandatory for the counties to participate in such mediation arranged for by your office as if it
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were ordered by the Court. UCA § 13-42-204(2). If you believe my interpretation of the
mandatory nature of this mediation is in error, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, if
your office intends to decline this request for mediation on statutory or other grounds, also
contact me immediately.
As further background regarding the nature of the dispute, I have attached here for your
reference, pleadings filed by the Selmans in First District Court against Box Elder County and
Cache County. I have also attached a copy of an administrative appeal that has been filed in
Cache County.
I would ask that you contact Cache County and Box Elder County at your earliest
convenience to inform them of our mediation request. After you have made contact with these
government entities, I look forward to setting a day for our mediation.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have questions or would like to discuss this
matter further.
Yours truly,
BEARNSON & PECK, L.C.

Brandon J. Baxter

BJB/ah
Enclosures
cc: Fred & Laura Selman (w/out enclosures)
Bret & Michelle Selman (w/out enclosures)
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July 25, 2007

Michael Zimmerman
Snell &WiImer, LLP
15 W S Temple, Ste 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1020
Re: Selman Arbitration.
Dear Mr. Zimmerman:
Your ofifice has informed me that you are willing to conduct the arbitration involving the Selmans, Box Elder
County, and Cache County. We appreciate your willingness to help resolve this situation. Here is the contact
information for the parties:
N. George Daines
Cache County Attorney
199 No. Main
Logan, UT 84321
Stephen R. Hadfield
Box Elder County Attorney
9 West Forest St, Ste 310
Brigham City, UT 84302

Brandon J. Baxter
(Attorney for the Selmans)
Bearnson & Peck
PO Box 675
74 W. 100 North
Logan, UT 84321

The Ombudsman Office can serve in a supporting role, and assist with scheduling, etc., but we will defer to
your judgment on how you want the arbitration to proceed. There is no set fee schedule for our office, and the
parties are aware that there will be a charge for your service.
For your convenience, I am including a copy of § 13-43-204 of the Utah Code, which authorizes arbitrations
through the Ombudsman Office.
Thank you for undertaking this matter, and I look forward to working with you. If you have questions, please
contact me at (801) 530-6391.

ELLIOT R.LAWRENCE
Attorney, Office of the Property Rights Ombudsman
cc: Brandon J. Baxter, N. George Daines, Stephen R. Hadfield.
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